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RESERVATIONS IN FAVOR OF STRANGERS TO
THE TITLE: CALIFORNIA ABANDONS THE
COMMON LAW RULE
A common practice in modem conveyancing is for A to grant
Blackacre to B, reserving or excepting an interest in Blackacre for
himself.1 However a problem develops when A attempts to reserve
an interest in favor of a third person. The common law opposed res-
ervations in favor of third persons.' The common law rule, which
grew out of feudal considerations, can be stated as follows:
No interest or estate in land may be created in favor of a stranger
to the title by means of a reservation or exception in the conveyance
thereof.3
California has traditionally recognized this common law rule pro-
hibiting reservations to strangers, although this recognition has been
in name only, since California has frequently circumvented the rule
when its application would lead to an undesirable result.4 In Willard
v. First Church of Christ, Scientist,' decided in July, 1972, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court expressly abandoned the common law rule,
thereby following the lead of Kentucky6 and Oregon.7 Numerous
commentators have criticized the rule,8 and the Restatement of Prop-
1. 6 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY Y 892 (P. Rohan ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as POWELL]; 6 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 3090 (repl. 1962) [hereinafter cited as
THOMPSON]. See generally Bigelow & Madden, Exception and Reservations of Ease-
ments, 38 HARv. L. REv. 180 (1924).
2. POWELL, supra note 1, at 892; 1 Shepp. Touch 80 (7th ed. 1820); ToMP-
SON, supra note 1, at § 3091; accord, Eldridge v. See Yup Co., 17 Cal. 44 (1860); Horn-
beck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. 73 (N.Y. 1812). See also Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1199
(1963).
3. Harris, Reservations in Favor of Strangers to the Title, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 127,
131 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Harris]; 23 AM. Jun.2d Deeds § 279 (1965).
4. Eldridge v. See Yup Co., 17 Cal. 44 (1860), was the first California decision
to apply the common law rule. Mott v. Nardo, 73 Cal. App. 2d 159, 166 P.2d 37
(1946), has been the only California appellate decision since 1860 to apply the rule.
But in Mott application of the rule did not defeat the grantor's intent.
5. 7 Cal. 3d 473, 498 P.2d 987, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1972).
6. Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1964); accord, Blair v. City of
Pikeville, 384 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1964); cf. Combs v. Hotinshell, 347 S.W.2d 550 (Ky.
1961).
7. Garza v. Grayson, 255 Ore. 413, 467 P.2d 960 (1970).
8. E.g., Harris, supra note 3, at 131; Meyers & Williams, Oil and Gas Conveyanc-
ing: Grants and Reservations by Owners of Fractional Mineral Interests, 43 VA. L. REv.
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erty rejected the rule nearly four decades ago.' Furthermore, the rule
has been partially abrogated by statute in England,10 California" and
other jurisdictions. '
2
Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist
Willard was a quiet title action against the First Church of Christ,
Scientist (the church). A owned two adjoining parcels of land, lots
19 and 20, across the street from the church. Lot 19 had a building
on it, and lot 20 was vacant and used by the church for parking pur-
poses. A sold lot 19 to B, who used the building thereon as an office.
B later decided to resell the lot and approached the plaintiff, Willard,
a real estate broker. Willard wanted to purchase both lots 19 and 20,
and he subsequently entered into escrow with B for that purpose.
B then approached A with an offer to purchase lot 20. A, who was
willing to sell the lot provided the church could continue to use it
for parking purposes, consulted the attorney for the church. The at-
torney drafted a deed which provided that the conveyance was:
subject to an easement for automobile parking during church hours
for the benefit of the church on the property at the southwest cor-
639, 650-51 (1957); Comment, Real Property: Easements: Creation by Reservation or
Exception, 36 CALIF. L. REV. 470 (1948); Note, Reservations to Strangers to the Deed,
4 S.C.L.Q. 561 (1952); 25 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1940). But see 21 BAYLOR L. REV.
251 (1969).
9. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 472 (1944). "By a single instrument of
conveyance, there may be created an estate in land in one person and an easement in
another." Comment b provides: "Thus an easement may be created in C by a deed
by A which purports to convey Blackacre to B in fee reserving an easement to C. If, in
other respects, the necessary formalities for the creation of an easement are complied
with, such a reservation operates as an effective conveyance to the person in whose
favor the reservation is, in terms, made."
10. Law of Property, Act of 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 65(a). "A reserva-
tion of a legal estate shall operate at law without any execution of the conveyance by
the grantee of the legal estate out of which the reservation is made, or any regrant by
him, so as to create the legal estate reserved, and so as to vest the same in possession
in the person (whether being the grantor or not) for whose benefit the reservation is
made."
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1085 (West 1954). "A present interest, and the benefit
of a condition or covenant respecting property, may be taken by any natural person
under a grant, although not named a party thereto." This code section did not apply to
the Willard decision because the Church was not a "natural person." Furthermore,
only one intermediate appellate court opinion prior to Willard had cited section 1085,
Glatts v. Hanson, 181 P.2d 917, 922 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947). On appeal to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, 31 Cal. 2d 368, 188 P.2d 745 (1948), the opinion was modified
and affirmed without further reference to the statute.
12. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 67-1524 (1970); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-17
(1962); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-11-10 (1970); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 43-
4-19 (1967). The language in the preceding code sections is substantially similar
to the language found in section 1085 of the California Civil Code.
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ner of the intersection of Hilton Way and Francisco Boulevard
. . . such easement to run with the land only so long as the prop-
erty for whose benefit the easement is given is used for church
purposes.
13
Satisfied by the inclusion of this clause in the deed, A then sold
the property to B, who recorded the deed. Willard paid the agreed
purchase price into escrow and received B's deed to the property ten
days later. Willard then recorded the deed that he had received from
B. This deed did not mention the easement for parking purposes in
favor of the church. 4
Willard became aware of the easement some months later and
brought an action to quiet title to lot 20. The trial court found that
the parties to the deed containing the reservation clause intended to
convey an easement to the church, but that the clause they employed
was ineffectual in light of the common law rule that an interest in
property cannot be reserved to a stranger to the title. The court of
appeal affirmed. i r
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the common law rule
should no longer be followed in California.' 6 The court emphasized
that the rule was based on outmoded feudal considerations and that
the rule often frustrated the grantor's intent, thereby producing in-
equitable results.17  Justice Peters, speaking for a unanimous court,'8
pointed out that the modem tendency was to abandon the strict com-
mon law rules of construction in deeds' 9 and that the cardinal objec-
tive in construing deeds is to effectuate as far as possible the intention
of the grantor.20  The court also noted that in some instances the
common law approach conflicts with section 1085 of the Civil Code,2'
which allows an interest to pass to a third person under a grant pro-
vided the interest is present and the third party is a natural person.
2 2
Thus, although section 1085 would not apply to Willard because the
13. 7 Cal. 3d at 475, 498 P.2d at 988, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 740.
14. Id. Other problems were involved in the case, such as the failure of the deed
from B to Willard to contain the reserve clause. However, the court ignored these peri-
pheral issues and concentrated solely on the validity of the common law rule against
reservations in favor of strangers.
15. Civil No. 27569 (Cal. Ct. App., filed Dec. 19, 1971).
16. 7 Cal. 3d at 479, 498 P.2d at 991, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
17. Id. at 476-77, 498 P.2d at 989, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
18. Justice Mosk did not participate.
19. Harris, supra note 3, at 148-49 suggests that prior to Willard, California had
treated the common law rule as a mere rule of construction, thereby reducing it in
dignity and making avoidance of the rule more justifiable.
20. 7 Cal. 3d at 476, 498 P.2d at 989, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
21. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1085 (West 1954). The rule also conflicts with various
other sections of the Civil Code which deal with the interpretation of grants. See note
81 infra.
22. 7 Cal. 3d at 477 n.3, 498 P.2d at 990 n.3, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 742 n.3.
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church was not a natural person, application of the common law rule
would conflict directly with section 1085 whenever a present interest
was reserved in favor of a stranger to the title who was a natural per-
son.
Justice Peters added that a balancing of equitable and policy
considerations might warrant future application of the common law
rule to grants made prior to Willard, where the grantee has detrimen-
tally relied on the common law rule, or in situations where the rule
must be applied to protect settled titles.23 However, since Willard
involved no such special factors, the court concluded that the grantor's
intention to reserve an easement for automobile parking in favor of
the church should be given effect.24
Origins of the Common Law Rule
At common law, although both reservations and exceptions dimin-
ished the estate of the grantee, they were distinguishable from each
other in their consequences.2 A reservation creates in favor of the
grantor a new interest issuing out of the estate transferred-an interest
that did not exist as an independent right prior to the transfer. An
exception prevents some part of the grantor's interest from passing un-
der the granting clause so that the excepted interest remains in the
grantor. 20  For example, if A grants his farm, Blackacre, to B, "re-
serving" for himself an easement across Blackacre to construct a sewer
line, A has created a new interest in himself that did not previously
exist as an independent right. However, if A grants his farm, Black-
acre, to B, "except" the barn thereon, A has retained ownership of
the barn by preventing it from passing under the granting clause, and
the excepted interest remains in A.
27
Another primary distinction between a reservation and an excep-
tion at common law was that, because a reservation created an inter-
est in the grantor that did not exist as an independent right prior to
23. For example, if the grantee, reasonably relying on the common law rule,
obtains title insurance on the property reserved in the deed to the stranger, a balanc-
ing of the equities might result in the future application of the common law rule,
if the grant was made prior to Willard. See text accompanying notes 116-20 infra.
24. 7 Cal. 3d at 479, 498 P.2d at 991, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
25. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.29 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 6 POWELL.
supra note 1, at g 892; 6 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at § 3090.
26. 6 POWELL, supra note 1, at 892; 6 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at § 3090.
27. Boyer v. Murphy, 202 Cal. 23, 34, 259 P. 38, 41-42 (1927) quoting 18
C.J., Deeds § 339 at 340 (1919) as follows: "While this distinction between a reser-
vation and an exception has been uniformly recognized, the terms 'reservation' and
'exception' are often used interchangeably; and the technical meaning will give way to
the manifest intent, even though the technical term to the contrary is used." See also
6 THOMPSON, supra note 1, § 3090.
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the transfer, in order for the interest to pass to his heirs words of in-
heritance were necessary.28  Words of inheritance were not necessary in
an exception, since the interest simply remained in the grantor. Since
words of inheritance are no longer necessary in California, this distinc-
tion is no longer valid.
29
By definition, then, an exception cannot vest an interest in a third
party because title remains in the grantor. On the other hand, reser-
vations theoretically create a point in time when the reserved interest
passes from the grantee back to the grantor. This interruption in the
grantor's title would appear to make possible the vesting of the re-
served interest in a third person instead of only in the grantor. Yet
the common law rule refused to permit a reserved interest to vest in
favor of a third person.
There were originally two reasons why property could not be
conveyed by reservation. 30 The first reason was that operative words
of grant were necessary to create title. This requirement was a prod-
uct of the old feudal rules governing the alienability of land and was
based on feoffment with livery of seizin.Y1 Feoffment was the
method used to transfer estates of inheritance.32 Livery of seizin
consisted of a formal delivery of possession on the premises, sym-
bolized by the manual delivery of a clod or piece of turf from the
land, which was done in the presence of neighbors-to confirm the trans-
fer.33  Livery of seizin was an essential requisite of a feoffment, for
without it the feoffee had a mere estate at will.34 Thus, a writing
was not necessary to pass title by feoffment, although a charter was
sometimes drafted recording the ceremony.35 This cumbersome cere-
mony was superseded by conveyances by deed, such as the bargain
and sale under the Statute of Uses,3 the lease and release,37 the quit-
28. 6 POWELL, supra note 1, at f 892. See also 24 CALIF. L. REv. 468 (1936).
29. CAL. Cr CODE § 1072 (West 1954). "Words of inheritance or succession
are not requisite to transfer a fee in real property." Section 1072 applies to ease-
ments as well as fees. Collier v. Oelke, 202 Cal. App. 2d 843, 21 Cal. Rptr. 140
(1962).
30. See generally Harris, supra note 3, at 131-34.
31. 6 PowELL, supra note 1, at 879.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 5 (1956).
35. 6 POWELL, supra note 1, at 879.
36. Id. at 163-64; Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10 (1536). A bargain and
sale was, before the Statute of Uses, merely a contract to convey for a pecuniary con-
sideration, in consequence whereof equity regarded the bargainor as trustee or seized
to the use of the bargainee, and no deed or writing was necessary. The Statute of
Uses vested in such bargainee the complete ownership.
37. Id. at 163-64. A conveyance by lease and release was effected by creating
a use in land for years by means of the bargain and sale. The Statute of Uses an-
nexed a constructive possession thus executing the use, and creating a lease in posses-
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claim3 s and the grant.39 These new and ingenious devices later were
consolidated into a single form of conveyance, the grant.4" Thus,
deeds in their present form have evolved from the ancient charter, which
consisted of a recording of the ceremony of livery of seizin, describing
who gave what to whom.
Viewed in this light, a deed, in order to be effective, must explicitly
manifest the grantor's intent to convey the property."' At common
law this manifestation of intent depended on the presence of certain
technical words, such as "grant, bargain, sell, and convey." Even to-
day, although no particular words are necessary to pass title by deed,
and precisely what are operative words of grant is difficult to deter-
mine,42 the general rule still provides that a conveyance is valid only
if the grantor sufficiently signifies a clear intention to transfer title by
operation of the instrument.
Most jurisdictions hold that words such as "subject to," "reserv-
ing," or "excepting" fail to evidence the necessary intent to pass title
by deed and therefore do not qualify as words of grant."3 For exam-
ple, in McGarrigle v. Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum,4" Jones con-
veyed to McGarrigle certain described property provided "that after the
death of [McGarrigle], the said described lands shall become and be
the property of the Roman Catholic Girls Orphan Asylum . . .,,"
The court held that the words "shall become and be" were merely an
expression of the grantor's purpose and were not operative words of
grant. 6
sion, whereupon, a release being executed to the lessee, an estate in fee was vested in
him.
38. A quitclaim deed is one that passes any title, interest, or claim which the
grantor may have in the premises. It does not profess that such title is valid. Nor does
it warrant or covenant title. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1417 (4th ed. 1951).
39. A grant, at common law, was the regular method of passing the title of in-
corporeal hereditaments and all things other than personalty which were not sus-
ceptible of livery or seizin. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.4 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952).
40. Law of Property Act of 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 51.
41. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.44 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
42. Id.; 24 CALIF. L. REV. 468, 470 (1936). The difficulty in determining pre-
cisely what are operative words of grant is that there is no particular formula required,
nor are technical words necessary. Thus, the only test in detecting operative words
of grant is the somewhat nebulous requirement that the grantor's intent to transfer be
manifest. For a list of words that have been held sufficient and insufficient to mani-
fest the requisite intent to transfer, see 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 28 n.36 at 637.
43. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.48 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). "[W]ords
of exception or reservation are not words of grant and are ineffective to convey a right
or interest to a stranger to the deed."
44. 145 Cal. 694, 79 P. 447 (1905).
45. Id. at 695, 79 P. at 447.
46. Id. at 696, 79 P. at 448.
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The second reason why property could not be conveyed by res-
ervation was that during the period in which the rule developed, ali-
enation by deed was becoming far more flexible. The new method of
conveyance by deed such as the bargain and sale, the lease and release
and the quitclaim resulted in a vast increase in the frequency of the
transfer of property, which alarmed the judges. Consequently, the
courts sought to counteract these new liberal forms of conveyancing
by engrafting guidelines which defined the limits and methods of ali-
enability and assigned to each clause in the deed a specific and exclu-
sive function.
For example, it was the purpose of the granting clause to pass
seizin and the function of the reddendum to specify some rent or serv-
ice reserved by the grantor which was to be a charge upon the land."'
The courts strictly construed each clause in the deed. No clause could
have any operative effect beyond its assigned powers. This strict con-
struction of the functions of each clause precluded a reservation from
creating or transferring an interest to anyone other than the grantor
since that was the exclusive function of the granting clause. A reser-
vation could do no more than create in the grantor a specified interest
that had previously existed in the property conveyed. s
The Response of Modern Courts to the Common Law Rule
In interpreting the common law rule against reservations to stran-
gers, judges had to determine who might be properly classified as a
"stranger."49  Frequently, judicial dissatisfaction with the common
law rule led to the development of exceptions by which certain persons
were deemed not to be strangers. Various courts have held that a
reservation to the heirs of the grantor is equivalent to a reservation to
the grantor himself. 50 An heir of the grantee also has been excepted
47. 3 AmECAN LAW oF PROPERTY §§ 12.44, 12.48 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
48. Id. at § 12.48.
49. Harris, supra note 3, at 131. Harris points out the confusion of the courts in
determining whether the rule prohibits reservations to strangers to the title or to stran-
gers to the deed. A stranger to the title is a person who does not have an interest in
the property, whereas a stranger to the deed is a person who is not a party to the
deed. Fortunately, this distinction is usually not important because in most cases the
"stranger" is both a stranger to the deed and to the title. Furthermore, California re-
fused to give effect to a reservation in favor of a stranger to the title in Mott v. Nardo,
73 Cal. App. 2d 159, 166 P.2d 37 (1946), even though in Boyer v. Murphy, 202 Cal.
23, 259 P. 38 (1927), the court stated the rule applied only to strangers to the deed.
For the purposes of the present discussion, the rule applies to both types of strangers.
50. E.g., Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 43, 19 N.E.2d 673 (1939) (dis-
senting opinion); Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919); Blackman v.
Striker, 142 N.Y. 555, 37 N.E. 484 (1894). But cf. Legout v. Price, 318 Ill. 425, 149
N.E. 427 (1925).
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from stranger status." However, executors and administrators of the
grantor have been held to be strangers within the common law rule.52
Perhaps the most common exemption from stranger status is that which
has been accorded the spouse of the grantor. 53 Finally, in some instances
a public body or governmental agency is not considered to be a
stranger. 54
California's Treatment of the Rule
California's treatment of the common law rule prior to Willard
was marked by a conscious effort by the courts to avoid applying the
rule when it conflicted with the manifest intent of the grantor. The
rule first was applied in California in 1860 in Eldridge v. See Yup
Co.,53 but since then only one appellate decision has applied the rule,
and in that case its application did not defeat the grantor's intent.50
Since the Eldridge decision, California's courts resorted to three
distinct methods of avoiding the rule. First, the courts construed
the language of the deed as creating an exception rather than a res-
ervation, thus preventing the interest from passing to the grantee under
the terms of the grant.57  For example, in Butler v. Gosling,58 two
wives conveyed their property, joined by their respective husbands,
"reserving and saving from the effect and operation of this convey-
ance four square miles in two separate parts to be hereafter selected
and located by the said parties of the first part."59  The court held
51. Cf. Deaver v. Aaron, 159 Ga. 597, 126 S.E. 382 (1925).
52. Petition of Young, 11 R.I. 636 (1877); cf. Herbert v. Pue, 72 Md. 307, 20
A. 182 (1890) (attorney executing deed held a stranger).
53. Saunders v. Saunders, 373 Il. 302, 26 N.E.2d 126 (1940); DuBois v. Judy,
291 Ill. 340, 126 N.E. 104 (1920); Hurd v. Hurd, 64 Iowa 414, 20 N.W. 740 (1884);
Derham v. Hovey, 195 Mich. 243, 161 N.W. 883 (1917); Glasgow v. Glasgow, 221
S.C. 322, 70 S.E.2d 432 (1952); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 36 Tenn. App. 630, 260 S.W.2d
186 (1953). Contra, Ogle v. Barker, 224 Ind. 489, 68 N.E.2d 550 (1946); White v.
City of Marion, 139 Iowa 479, 117 N.W. 254 (1908); Leidig v. Hoopes, 288 P.2d 402
(Okla. 1955); Ryan v. Fort Worth Nat. Bank, 433 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968);
McKee v. Douglas, 362 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
54. Cf. Dade County v. Little, 115 So. 2d 19 (Fla. App. 1959); Edwards v.
Brusha, 18 Okla. 234, 90 P. 727 (1907); Bolio v. Marvin, 130 Mich. 82, 89 N.W. 563
(1902).
55. 17 Cal. 44 (1860). The common law rule was an alternative reason for the
decision. The primary reason for invalidating the interest was the rule that a restric-
tion of property to a certain use was void. See Willard v. First Church of Christ, 7
Cal. 3d 473, 477 n.2, 498 P.2d 987, 989-90 n.2, 102 Cal. Rptr. 738, 741 n.2 (1972).
56. Mott v. Nardo, 73 Cal. App. 2d 159, 164, 166 P.2d 37, 40 (1946).
57. Boyer v. Murphy, 202 Cal. 23, 259 P. 38 (1927); Butler v. Gosling, 130 Cal.
422, 62 P. 596 (1900); cf. Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. Richvale Land Co., 40 Cal. App.
451, 181 P. 98 (1919).
58. 130 Cal. 422, 62 P. 596 (1900).
59. Id. at 424, 62 P. at 596.
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that although the clause began with the word "reserving," "it was in re-
ality, as its terms declare, an 'exception' of a portion of the land from
the effect and operation of the conveyance."6  Treating a reservation
as an exception also causes the title to the interest to remain in the
grantor, thus still failing to carry out the grantor's intent. Despite
the fact that this method of avoiding application of the rule does not
confer title on the stranger, the method is still recognized as an effec-
tive means of creating a reservation in favor of a stranger; 61 since the
interest remains in the grantor, he may subsequently convey that in-
terest to the stranger, thereby accomplishing the same result in two
conveyances as was attempted in the original transfer.
A second method of frustrating application of the common law
rule against reservations to strangers is for the stranger to invoke the
doctrine of estoppel. 62  The courts reason that one who has notice
and has agreed to a reservation to a third person should not be al-
lowed to disregard it. Thus, in Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. Richvale
Land Co.,6 3 Richvale reserved "to its assigns and successors a right of
way in, to and across said colony number one and all portions thereof
for the purpose of constructing and maintaining and operating . . .
irrigation and drainage ditches .... "64 Thereafter, an agreement to
sell a portion of the land was executed, in which the vendors recog-
nized and consented to the reservation. The court held that an at-
tempted reservation or exception in favor of a stranger, although not
conferring title, may sometimes operate as an admission in his favor
or as an estoppel against the grantor. 65 In other words, since the
grantor recognized and consented to the reservation of an interest in
favor of a third person, the recognition operated as an admission of
the interest vested in the third person. The grantor was therefore
estopped from denying the validity of the reservation in favor of the
stranger.
The above reasoning was not directed to estopping the grantee
from denying the validity of the reservation in favor of the stranger. 
6
However, courts in other jurisdictions have held that persons claiming
60. Id. at 425, 62 P. at 597.
61. 3 AmEmCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.48 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 B. DEV-
LiN, DEVLiN ON DEEDS § 982 (3d ed. 1911).
62. Butler v. Gosling, 130 Cal. 422, 426, 62 P. 596, 597 (1900); Sutter Butte
Canal Co. v. Richvale Land Co., 40 Cal. App. 451, 457, 181 P. 98, 100 (1919). But see
Mott v. Nardo, 73 Cal. App. 2d 159, 163, 166 P.2d 37, 40 (1946) (estoppel doctrine
was deemed not to apply).
63. 40 Cal. App. 451, 181 P. 98 (1919).
64. Id. at 454, 181 P. at 99.
65. Id. at 457, 181 P. at 100.
66. 23 AM. Ju. 2d DEEDS § 279 (1965). See also Guaranty Loan & Trust Co.
v. Helena Improv. Dist., 148 Ark. 56, 228 S.W. 1045 (1921); Beardslee v. New Berlin
Light & Power Co., 207 N.Y. 34, 100 N.E. 434 (1912).
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under the grantee are precluded from avoiding a reservation of rights
already existing in a stranger." Adding strength to the estoppel line
of reasoning is the fact that the grantee frequently has paid a deflated
price for the property as a result of the reserving clause.68
California courts have fashioned a third exception to the com-
mon law rule when the third person is the grantor's spouse. 9 In
such instances the courts have recognized the close relation between
husband and wife and accordingly have refused to classify the spouse
as a stranger. There is a sound basis for holding that a spouse is not
a stranger within the common law rule against reservations to stran-
gers. In Saunders v. Saunders"° the court explained that:
The husband ...has such a present interest in the property by
way of a homestead, or such indefeasible interest as heir or by way
of dower, that the combined interest of husband and wife in the
property might be deemed sufficient to support the reservation of
a life estate to either or both of them, by their joint execution of a
deed which conveyed or waived all of their rights. 71
In Boyer v. Murphy,72 a husband and wife joined in a conveyance
to their children of improved property belonging to the wife. The ha-
bendum clause reserved to the husband and wife "the ownership and
possession [of the property] during the lifetime of the parties of the
first part [husband and wife] and the survivor of them. ' 73  The
court ignored the common law rule that a reservation cannot be made
in favor of a stranger to the title by treating the husband as a non-
stranger and construing the "reservation" as an exception, thus giving
a life estate to both husband and wife.
7 4
Finally, in some instances, California courts have simply refused
to resort to technicalities to defeat the obvious intention of the par-
ties.7 For example, in Smith v. Kraintz,76 Hollender owned certain
67. E.g., Dade County v. Little, 115 So. 2d 19 (Fla. App. 1959); Dalton v. Eller,
153 Tenn. 418, 284 S.W. 68 (1925). Furthermore the courts frequently recognize
and preserve presently existing rights in strangers by treating the purported reservation
as an exception. See also text and accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
68. Willard v. First Church of Christ, 7 Cal. 3d 473, 477, 498 P.2d 987, 989-90,
102 Cal. Rptr. 739, 741 (1972).
69. Boyer v. Murphy, 202 Cal. 23, 259 P. 38 (1927). Contra, Butler v. Gosling
130 Cal. 422, 62 P. 596 (1900).
70. 373 111. 302, 26 N.E.2d 126 (1940).
71. Id. at 308, 26 N.E.2d at 129. Boyer v. Murphy, 202 Cal. 23, 32, 259 P.
38, 42 recognized that a reservation in favor of a spouse also benefits the grantor, al-
though the court declined to rule on whether the reservation was valid.
72. 202 Cal. 23, 259 P. 38 (1927).
73. Id. at 26, 259 P. at 39.
74. Id. at 33, 259 P. at 42.
75. Smith v. Kraintz, 201 Cal. App. 2d 696, 20 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1962); Sutter
Butte Canal Co. v. Richvale Land Co., 40 Cal. App. 451, 181 P. 98 (1919).
76. 201 Cal. App. 2d 696, 20 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1962).
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property which he conveyed to Goodrich, reserving a "non-exclusive
right of way for road purposes and public utilities. ' 77 Goodrich
later conveyed the property to Smith, who attempted to deny the effi-
cacy of the reservation. The court, after recognizing that generally
a reservation would be valid only if in favor of the grantor, stated:
the intent to dedicate, however, may be established in every con-
ceivable way in which such intention may be manifested, and the res-
ervation in the deed, although not effectual as such reservation, may
be found by the courts to evidence the essential intent to dedicate
to the public. 78
The court concluded that the reservation in favor of the public and the
intent to dedicate for public purposes were sufficient to overcome the
effect of the common law rule.79
A central theme runs through the cases noted above: namely,
that where application of the common law rule would frustrate the clear
intention of the grantor and thereby work an injustice, the California
courts have not hesitated to find ways to circumvent the rule. By ex-
pressly abandoning the common law rule in Willard, the California
Supreme Court has finally made it possible for California courts to up-
hold reservations in favor of third persons without having to resort to
legal fictions. As expressed by Justice Peters, the court's "primary
objective in construing a conveyance is to try to give effect to the in-
tent of the grantor. '80  The court's recognition of the basic incom-
patability of the grantor's intent with the common law rule, and its
rejection of the latter, is a step away from the shadows of feudalism.
Also, by expressly making the grantor's intent the dominant consid-
eration, the court has aligned this area of the law with California's
general statutory principles of construction.81
77. Id. at 699, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
78. Id. at 700, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 474. Accord, Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. Richvale
Land Co., 40 Cal. App. 451, 456-57, 181 P. 98, 100 (1919) (court not justified in re-
sorting to technical refinements as to the meaning of "reservations" to defeat obvious
intent).
79. 201 Cal. App. 2d at 700, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
80. Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 7 Cal. 3d 473, 476, 498 P.2d 987,
989, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739, 741 (1972).
81. The construction of contracts is treated in several sections of the Civil Code.
E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1066 (West 1954): "Grants are to be interpreted in like man-
ner with contracts in general, except so far as is otherwise provided in this Article";
id. § 1636: "A contract must be interpreted so as to give effect to the mutual inten-
tion of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is as-
certainable and lawful"; id. § 1641: "The whole of a contract is to be taken together,
so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping
to interpret the other"; id. § 1644: "The words of a contract are to be understood in
their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning;
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The Rule's Treatment in Other Jurisdictions
The common law rule has been recognized in jurisdictions outside
California.8 2  However, many of these states follow California's former
practice of applying the rule in some instances, while finding methods
of circumventing it in others.8 3 Many courts will construe the pertinent
provision in the deed as an exception, thus preventing the interest from
passing to the grantee.8 4 Under this construction title does not pass
to the stranger. It remains in the grantor, thus creating a less than de-
sirable result.8 5 One Oklahoma case, Burns v. Bastien,86 went so far
as to hold that the purported reservation was an exception, and an ex-
ecutive passive trust was created in favor of the stranger.
In Burns the defendant Bastien, joined by his wife, executed a
warranty deed of certain land to Trippett. The deed contained a provi-
sion "reserving an undivided three-fourths interest in and to all the
royalties of oil and gas under and pertaining to said premises, which
said reservation of royalty shall belong to George Bastien, Charles Bas-
tien, and E.E. Mead, share and share alike."8 " E.E. Mead later con-
veyed his one-quarter interest to Bums, who brought the action to quiet
title to the royalties. The court construed the reservation to be an ex-
ception in favor of the grantors and held that a valid express trust
was created in favor of E.E. Mead, based on the intent of the parties.88
Courts in other jurisdictions also have raised the issue of estoppel
by deed 9 and equitable charges9 ° to invalidate the common law rule
unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given
to them by usage, in which case the latter must be followed."
82. E.g., Rye v. Baumann, 231 Ark. 278, 329 S.W.2d 161 (1959) (exception);
Guaranty Loan & Trust Co., v. Helena Improv. Dist., 148 Ark. 56, 228 S.W. 1045
(1921); Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 360 P.2d 403 (1961); Haverhill Savings
Bank v. Griffin, 184 Mass. 419, 68 N.E. 839 (1903); Bauer v. Bauer, 180 Neb. 177,
141 N.W.2d 837 (1966); Tuscarora Club v. Brown, 215 N.Y. 543, 109 N.E. 597
(1915); Stetson v. Nelson, 118 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1962); Brace v. Van Eps, 21 S.D.
65, 109 N.W. 147 (1906); Ryan v. Fort Worth Nat. Bank, 433 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968); Simmons v. Northern Pac. Ry., 88 Wash. 384, 153 P. 321 (1915);
Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 134 W. Va. 900, 62 S.E.2d 337 (1950); Burnell v.
Roush, 404 P.2d 836 (Wyo. 1965).
83. E.g., Saunders v. Saunders, 373 111. 302, 26 N.E.2d 126 (1940); Martin v.
Cook, 102 Mich. 267, 60 N.W. 679 (1894); Glasgow v. Glasgow, 221 S.C. 322, 70
S.E.2d 432 (1952); Stetson v. Nelson, 118 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1962).
84. E.g., Deaver v. Aaron, 159 Ga. 597, 126 S.E. 382 (1925); Martin v. Cook, 102
Mich. 267, 60 N.W. 679 (1894); Lemon v. Lemon, 273 Mo. 484, 201 S.W. 103 (1918);
Burns v. Bastien, 174 Okla. 40, 50 P.2d 377 (1935).
85. See authorities cited note 61 supra.
86. 174 Okla. 40, 50 P.2d 377 (1935).
87. Id. at 41, 50 P.2d at 379.
88. Id. at 45-46, 50 P.2d at 384.
89. Beinlein v. Johns, 102 Ky. 570, 44 S.W. 128 (1898); Dalton v. Eller, 153
Tenn. 418, 284 S.W. 68 (1926); Hodge v. Boothby, 48 Me. 68 (1861). Contra,
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where the grantor's intent is clear and injustice would result from ap-
plication of the rule. For example, in Dalton v. Eller,91 where a store-
house occupied and owned by the stranger, situated on property owned
by the grantor, was excepted 902 from the deed, the clause was held valid
even though it was in favor of a third person. The grantee was held
estopped from asserting the invalidity of the exception based on the in-
tent of the parties.
93
Similarly, in Wall v. Wall,94 where the deed recited that the
grantor reserved to herself "the possession, use, enjoyment, and control
of the tract of land for and during her natural life" and reserved also
"the care and support of her daughter for and during [her] life,"96 the
court held that the clause was sufficient to create an equitable charge
on the rents and profits of the land for the care and maintenance of the
daughter, a stranger to the title, as against owners who took title to
the land with express notice of the provision.97  Finally, as in Cali-
fornia, several other jurisdictions do not apply the rule when the third
person is the grantor's spouse.98
Abolition of the Rule in Other Jurisdictions
In abandoning the common law rule, the California court in Wil-
lard relied on decisions in Kentucky99 and Oregon,100 which previously
had rejected the rule as unsuited to modem conveyancing needs. In
the Kentucky case, Townsend v. Cable,101 A granted a parcel of land
to B with a reservation in favor of C. The Kentucky Supreme Court,
which had indicated in an earlier decision its possible willingness to
abolish the rule, °1 02 forthrightly rejected the rule and held that an inter-
Guarantee Loan & Trust Co. v. Helena Improv. Dist., 148 Ark. 56, 228 &W. 1045
(1921).
90. Wall v. Wall, 126 N.C. 405, 35 S.E. 811 (1900); Maynard v. Maynard, 4
Edw. Ch. 711 (N.Y. 1848).
91. 153 Tenn. 418, 284 S.W. 68 (1927).
92. Although the clause implemented in Dalton was, by its terms, an exception,
the same result could have been reached in California had the clause been a reserva-
tion. Boyer v. Murphy, 202 Cal. 23, 34, 259 P. 38, 41-42 (1927).
93. 153 Tenn. at 429, 284 S.W. at 71.
94. 126 N.C. 405, 35 S.E. 811 (1900).
95. Id. at 406, 35 S.E. af 811.
96. Id. The court construed this clause to mean that the grantor intended to
have her daughter supported out of the income and profits from the land.
97. Id. at 407-08, 35 S.E. at 811.
98. Cases cited note 53 supra.
99. Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1964).
100. Garza v. Grayson, 255 Ore. 413, 467 P.2d 960 (1970).
101. 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1964).
102. "In a future case involving what is intended to be a conveyance over of some
interest such as an easement . . . but is inartfully couched in terms of reservation or
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est did pass to C under the deed.10 The court reasoned that "the dis-
tinction between a conveyance to a third party and a reservation in his
favor is tenuous and artificial and has long outlived the reason for its
existence in the first place"' 4 and that the intention of the grantor as ex-
pressed within the four comers of the instrument must be the controlling
factor in construing a deed. 1°5 The court indicated that substance
rather than form should control and that technicalities should be avoided
when the intent of the grantor is plain and obvious.' 00
In 1970 the Supreme Court of Oregon adopted the reasoning of
Townsend and abolished the common law rule in Oregon.10 7  In Garza
v. Grayson... the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to establish
the existence of an easement over defendant's land for the maintenance
and construction of a public utility service line. The court confronted
the rule directly and, relying on the language of Townsend"9 and the
Restatement of Property, 1 0 abandoned the rule."'
The common law rule, then, represents the preference of form over
substance, of technicalities over intention. Furthermore, the rule runs
counter to a vast number of commonly accepted forms of conveyancing
in which it is common for a grantor to convey different interests to two
or more persons by the same instrument. These interests may all be cor-
poreal, as in the case of the grant of a cotenancy to two or more parties;
or one may be corporeal and the other incorporeal, as where successive
interests are granted, one being a present estate and the other a re-
mainder. "
12
The common law rule against reservations in favor of strangers was
developed at a time when alienation by deed was becoming far more com-
monplace."' The courts, however, mistrusted these ingenious de-
vices and therefore established strict rules constraining the methods of
alienability. Today, with the modem tendency to favor the free alien-
ability of land, such a rule has no logical basis or justification, and
exception in favor of a third party, it may be proper that we consider the abolition
of the distinction [between a conveyance to a third party and a reservation in his
favor]." Combs v. Hounshell, 347 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Ky. 1964).
103. 378 S.W.2d at 808.
104. Id. at 807, quoting Combs v. Hounshell, 347 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Ky. 1964).
105. Id. at 808.
106. Id.
107. Garza v. Grayson, 255 Ore. 413, 467 P.2d 960 (1970).
108. Id.
109. Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W 2d 806 (Ky. 1964).
110. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 472 (1936).
111. 255 Ore. at 415, 467 P.2d at 962.
112. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.29 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
113. See text accompanying notes 30-48 supra.
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the abandonment of what Justice Peters called an "inapposite feudal
shackle" was long overdue.
114
Impact of the Rule
As a result of Willard, California now allows interests to pass to
persons not a party to the deed without words of grant. As mentioned,
modem conveyancing commonly permits a single instrument to convey
an interest to more than one person. However, despite the liberal con-
struction afforded instruments today, words of grant generally are nec-
essary to pass title by deed."15 Willard may on its face appear to be
inconsistent with the requirement that words of grant be employed to
pass title. However, a more accurate interpretation of Willard is that
interests may be created by a conveyance through the granting clause or
the reddendum. Thus, in a deed of conveyance, words of reservation
-without traditional words of grant-are now sufficient to pass title
through the reddendum. The effect of Willard is that no longer will
the practicing attorney have to depend on a sympathetic judge to imply
some fictitious exception to the common law rule against reservations to
strangers in order to effect the grantor's intent. Now a grantor may,
through words of reservation, pass title to a third person who is a stran-
ger to the title.
Further Application of the Rule
Although the supreme court ruled in Willard that the common
law rule should no longer be followed as the law in California, the court
indicated that in certain cases a "balancing of equitable and policy con-
siderations" might warrant future application of the rule to presently ex-
isting deeds. The court noted that:
We must balance the injustice which would result from refusing to
give effect to the grantor's intent against the injustice, if any, which
might result by failing to give effect to reliance on the old rule and
the policy against disturbing settled titles." 0
For example, where A conveys Blackacre to B, reserving- an interest in
favor of C, and B and his title insurance company reasonably rely on
the common law rule, the rule may still be applied to prevent a sub-
stantial hardship to B. Similarly, where A grants Blackacre to B
reserving an interest to C, and C asserts title to his interest many years
later, the common law rule may also be employed to promote the policy
against disturbing settled titles by defeating C's claim.
114. See Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 7 Cal. 3d 473, 476, 498 P.2d
987, 989, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739, 741 (1972).
115. 3 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 12.44 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
116. 7 Cal. 3d at 479, 498 P.2d at 991, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
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However, instances such as these, where the rule might defeat the
interest in favor of a third person, are likely to occur only infrequently.
First, the rule will apply only to presently existing deeds. 117  Second,
even if the rule is held to apply, the court will still consider the several
exceptions to the rule developed by the courts 18 and the partial abroga-
tion of the rule by section 1085 of the Civil Code."' In Willard these
equitable considerations were not sufficient to justify application of the
common law rule.12° There was no evidence of any reliance on the
common law rule by a title insurance company and, further, no reli-
ance on the rule by Willard, since he had not read the deed con-
taining the reservation. Nor were there any problems with ancient title
because the church had used the parking lot continuously throughout
the period in question.
Conclusion
For more than one hundred years American courts have espoused
the commendable theory that the intention of the grantor should be the
controlling factor in interpreting deeds and that technicalities should not
defeat the obvious intent of the grantor. Despite this purported liberal
construction of deeds, many of these same courts have upheld, at least
in name, the archaic common law rule that reservations to strangers are
ineffective. This obvious inconsistency has at times led to highly un-
desirable results. Admittedly, the courts have been reluctant to apply
the rule. Unfortunately, however, it has been the practice of many courts
to avoid rather than abandon the rule. In an attempt to give effect to
the intention of the grantor by circumventing technical rules of con-
struction, the courts have resorted to technicalities as artificial as those
they were seeking to avoid, and the resultant unpredictability is pre-
cisely what the common law rule sought to eliminate.
Today the common law rule has clearly outlived the reasons for
its existence. Its abandonment is a significant step towards creating
clarity and uniformity in conveyancing. Unfortunately, to date only
three states have abandoned this obviously archaic and impractical
rule;' 2' indeed its rejection is less than a trend. 2 2 However, such aban-
117. Id.
118. Id. at 479, n.8, 498 P.2d at 991 n.8, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 743 n.8.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 479, 498 P.2d at 991, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
121. Three states-Kentucky, Oregon and California-have completely abandoned
the common law rule by judicial action. Cases cited note 5-7 supra. Four other states
-Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and Rhode Island-have partially abrogated
the rule by statute. Statutes cited note 12 supra.
122. The following cases still recognize the common law rule: Rye v. Baumann,
231 Ark. 278, 329 S.W.2d 161 (1959); Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 360 P.2d 403
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donment is the only true solution to a problem area of the law that has
become unnecessarily contrived.
Richard W. Lasater 11*
(1961); Bauer v. Bauer, 180 Neb. 177, 141 N.W.2d 837 (1966); Stetson v. Nelson,
118 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1962); Ryan v. Fort Worth Nat. Bank, 433 &W.2d (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968); McKee v. Douglas, 362 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Burnell v.
Roush, 404 P.2d 836 (Wyo. 1965). Some, however, avoid application of the rule
by invoking the various methods of circumventing the rule discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 82-98 supra.
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